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Abstract
Next generation networks will comprise different wireless networks including cellular technologies, WLAN and
indoor technologies. To support these heterogeneous environments, there is a need to consider a new design of
the network infrastructure. Furthermore, this heterogeneous environment implies that future devices will need to
roam between different networks using vertical handover techniques. When a mobile user moves into a new
foreign network, data confidentiality and mutual authentication between the user and the network are vital issues
in this heterogeneous environment. This article deals with these issues by first examining the implication of
moving towards an open architecture, and then looking at how current approaches such as the 3GPP, HOKEY and
mobile ethernet respond to the new environment while trying to address the security issue. The results indicate
that a new authentication and key agreement protocol is required to secure handover in this environment. Casper/
FDR, is used in the analysis and development of the protocol. The proposed protocol has been proven to be
successful in this heterogeneous environment.
Keywords: authentication and key agreement protocol, secure vertical handover, heterogeneous environments,
Casper/FDR
1 Introduction
Future communication systems must allow ubiquitous
connectivity where users are always connected from any-
where and at any time. The need for continuous connec-
tivity is being met by the development and deployment
of a number of wireless technologies including 3G/
HSPDA, WLAN [1] with long term evolution (LTE) [2]
and Wimax. However, the widespread deployment of
wireless networks will have a significant impact on the
evolution of the Internet. However with the wide-scale
deployment of wireless networks as end-systems, there
will now be significant differences in network characteris-
tics in terms of bandwidth, latency, packet loss and error
characteristics. These developments imply that the future
Internet will not have a single unified infrastructure. The
future Internet comprises a fast core network with slower
wireless networks attached around the core. The core
network will consist of a super-fast backbone using opti-
cal switches and fast access networks which is mainly
based on wired technologies such as the multi-protocol
label switching (MPLS). Most of the peripheral networks
will make use of different wireless technologies. Due to
the fact that, the connectivity in the peripheral networks
will be based on a wide variety of wireless technologies,
provided by different operators, various network opera-
tors need to cooperate and coexist in the core network.
Furthermore, new providers might choose to join the
network and share the spectrum.
Unlike current communication systems such as 2G
and 3G, which introduce closed environments where the
core network is controlled and owned by sole network
operators and thus its security is mainly based on the
assumption that, the core network is physically secure,
the above discussion highlights the fact that we are
moving towards an open, heterogeneous environment
where the core network is not controlled by a single
operator, so multiple operators will have to cooperate.
This tendency will bring about radical changes to the
* Correspondence: M.Aiash@mdx.ac.uk
1School of Engineering and Information Systems (EIS), Middlesex University,
London NW4 4BT, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Aiash et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2012, 2012:57
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/57
© 2012 Aiash et al; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
handover mechanisms. Current mechanisms mainly sup-
port the network-controlled handover in which, the
decision to implement handover is taken by the network
(s) to which the mobile device is currently attached.
While, this type of handover works fine in current sys-
tems, where the core network is controlled by a sole
operator and thus information about the topology of dif-
ferent networks is available, this type of handover is not
suitable for heterogeneous environments, since multiple
operators coexist in the core network. This highlights
the need for the client-based handover in which the cli-
ent is the deciding entity rather than the network. In
this type of handover, the mobile device will be respon-
sible for initiating the handover, acquiring and releasing
the resources in the new and old network respectively.
However, this situation brings about new security
threats in term of authenticating the mobile device to
access the new network in case of handover and main-
taining data confidentiality as well as controlling the
allocation of network resources in case of handover by
making sure that this process is accomplished by
authorized parties. While the latter issue was addressed
by the research in [3], the first has been investigated by
different research efforts such as [4-9].
These efforts have considered the openness and
dynamic nature of the future networks while designing
their security mechanisms. However, some solutions
such as the AKA protocols for the 3GPP-WLAN and
3GPP-WiMAx internetworking [8,9] presumed to have
the UMTS infrastructure as a backbone of the core net-
work, while different networks such as WLAN and
WiMax could be attached to it. Obviously, this solution
does not go along with the open architecture of future
networks. Other studies such as the AKA protocol of the
HOKEY WG [4] proposed to use a common platform
such as the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) [10]
to hide the differences between the access networks. In
contrast, the solution proposed by the mobile ethernet
group [7,11] assumes a generic network structure, which
is very close to the afore-mentioned open architecture.
Therefore, this article will consider the mobile ethernet’s
vertical handover AKA protocol as a model to investigate
the security threats in the open architecture. The proto-
col will be analyzed and verified using formal methods
approach. The results discovered some security breaches
in the deployment of the mobile ethernet’s AKA proto-
col, which highlight the need for a new protocol.
Modeling and analysis of security protocols with com-
munication sequential process (CSP) [12] and failure-
divergence refinement (FDR) [13] have been proven to be
effective in discovering attacks in many protocols such as
[14-16]. However, describing protocols in CSP is a quite
exhaustive and time-consuming process. Therefore, a
new compiler has been introduced in [17]. The compiler
is known as Casper, it accepts an abstract description of
the protocol and translates it into CSP. In order to verify
the security properties of the protocol, the FDR is used
to model and analyze the CSP output.
This study adds the following contributions: First, it
analyzes some of AKA protocols for handover. Second,
it uses the Casper/FDR to formally verify and analyze
the handover AKA protocol of the mobile ethernet, the
verification discovered authentication attack. Thirdly, to
address the discovered drawbacks of the protocols in
the literature, a new AKA protocol for secure vertical
handover in heterogeneous environments is introduced.
A detailed refinement of the protocol is presented with
a formal versification of each of the refinement stages
using Casper/FDR. We also describe all the attacks
found in each stage of the refinement process. The last
version of the protocol, is formally verified and proven
to achieve many desired security properties.
The rest of this article will be organized as follows:
Section 2 views a potential structure of future open net-
works and describes the IEEE 802.21 research to sup-
port vertical handover in heterogeneous environment.
Section 3 describes some related research to provide
secure vertical handover such as the work of the
HOKEY, 3GPP and mobile ethernet groups. Since the
mobile ethernet framework considers an open network
architecture, Section 4 explains the initial AKA protocol
of the mobile ethernet [7] and verifies the protocol
using Casper/FDR. The verification results highlights the
need for a new AKA protocol. Using a progressive
approach, Section 5 explains and formally verifies the
refinement stages, which led to the final version of the
protocol. The article concludes in Section 6.
2 Network evolution
The next generation networks (NGN) will provide ubi-
quitous computing via the seamless operation of hetero-
geneous wireless networks including WLAN, 3G,
WiMax, Ultrawideband, etc. Using these networks, users
will be continuously connected to the Internet as they
move around. Vertical handover which allows mobile
nodes to seamlessly switch their connections from one
network to another is a key mechanism that must be
supported in NGNs. However, in order to effectively
support vertical handover there is a need to re-examine
the current network structure and define the required
changes in the network. These changes need to be
reflected in a new networking architecture which
attempts to clearly define the functions, their order and
the interlocking relationships that are necessary to sup-
port heterogeneous networking. Therefore, the following
sections describe recent research efforts to define a new
structure for future networks to manage the resources
in the heterogeneous environment and support the
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vertical handover in this environment. They also differ-
entiate between the vertical and horizontal handover,
then describe related work to enhance the vertical hand-
over experience either by introducing new vertical hand-
over mechanisms or by addressing the End-To-End QoS
and security provision in heterogeneous environments.
3 Overview of future heterogeneous networks
The network infrastructure of NGNs will be owned by
different operators. Additionally, new operators could
install their network hardware and join the core net-
work. However, interoperability between different opera-
tors is a key challenge in this open, heterogeneous
environment. To address this issue, the ITU-T recom-
mended deploying a central management entity referred
to as the regulatory authority [18], which controls differ-
ent network operators and service providers. The regu-
latory authorities are regulatory bodies with the power
to influence policies in telecommunication services, they
are responsible for creating national policies to encou-
rage the development of telecommunications, also they
provide essential powers to regulate license agreements,
interconnection arrangements, and monitoring unlawful
telecommunication activities.
To enhance the concept of a central management
entity, the study of the Y-Comm group [3] and Daidalos
II [19] proposed the concept of core end-point (CEP) as
an administrative entity to control the different wireless
networks in a regional area, as shown in Figure 1.
A detailed view of the CEP’s structure along with the
attached networks is shown in Figure 2. The figure
shows a hierarchical architecture, where the bottom
level is represented by several access points (APs) and
access routers (ARs) that communicate with the wireless
interfaces in the mobile terminals. The middle level
comprises a number of technology-specific domains,
where each domain represents a certain network opera-
tor and technology such as 2G, 3G, and Wi-Fi. For
these domains to interoperate, the CEP, which is resid-
ing at the top level acts as a central administrative
domain to control the inter-domain functions and pro-
vide overall management.
Although the structure in Figure 2 is for future net-
work, it can also be used alongside the architecture of
current systems; for instance, the technologies-specific
domains in the mid-level correspond to the circuit
switching and packet switching core networks in the
GSM and GPRS or UMTS. The major difference is that
the proposed structure is an open architecture, where
different technologies and operators could join the net-
work. However, to control this open architecture, the
CEP in the top-level has been proposed to manage the
resources in all various domains.
In order to deal with the QoS and security tasks in
this architecture, a number of operational entities have
been proposed as follows:
- The central A3C server (CA3C): This is the central
authentication, authorization; accounting and cost
(A3C) server in the CEP. The CA3C holds the ser-
vice level of agreements (SLAs) along with the net-
work level of agreements (NLAs), which describe the
clients’ terms for using the service and accessing
networks, respectively.
- The central QoS broker (CQoSB): is responsible for
negotiating QoS in case of cross-CEP handover.
- The domain A3C server (DA3C): The DA3C is
responsible for handling users’ service aspects. Initi-
ally, it extracts users’ profile information from the
CA3C and uses this information for authorizing the
users’ requests to access services.
- The domain QoS broker (DQoSB): manages the
resources of the attached peripheral networks with
respect user preferences and network availability, it
also makes a per-flow admission control decision.
- The access router (AR): This is the link between the
domain and the peripheral networks; it enforces the
admission control decision, taken by the DQoSB.
Since the AR acts as a relay between the mobile
terminal (MT) in the peripheral network and the
DA3C, using security terminology, the AR will be
referred to as the authenticator (Auth).
These entities cooperate to provide security and QoS-
related tasks. However, since there is a need for QoS
provision in different situations, three QoS-Signalling
models have been proposed in [3]:
- The registration model: describes the procedure fol-
lowed when the MT first attaches to the peripheral
network. This model basically involves authenticating
the MT to use the network, then enforcing the access
control policies based on the MT’s SLA. This article
investigates different AKA protocols and proposes a
novel one to be integrated with the registration model.
- The connection initiation model: deals with the
case when the MT starts a connection to a server
SP. It involves authorizing the connection request in
both the source and the destination networks and
making sure that it complies with the pre- agreed on
QoS. Once this is achieved, layer two resources in
both networks are prepared to accommodate the
connection.
- The handover model: This step explains the QoS pro-
vision in the case of inter and intra administrative
domain handover. This step deploys the authentication
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Figure 1 The future internet architecture.
Figure 2 The network structure.
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and key agreement (AKA) protocol to achieve pre-
authentication and launching the security materials in
the target network also in this step, the QoS- context
is transferred and used by the access control mechan-
ism in the new network.
More details about these models are found in [3].
3.1 Vertical handover vs horizontal handover
In handover, mobile nodes change the point of attachment
from one network AP to another. However, if the mobile
node moves within a single technology network, this is
known as horizontal handover. So a mobile node in GSM
network performs a horizontal handover when it moves
from one GSM cell/access point to another. Vertical hand-
over takes place when the mobile node roams between dif-
ferent access technologies switching from GSM to 3G or
Wi-Fi for instance. Hence, in heterogeneous environment,
where there are many wireless networks operating in the
same area, vertical handover will become commonplace.
Thus the security threats such as the authentication of
mobile devices as well as access to network resources need
to be address in order to provide secure vertical handover.
3.2 Vertical handover mechanisms in heterogeneous
environments
The IEEE 802.21 working group has developed stan-
dards to enable handover and interoperability between
heterogeneous network types including both 802 and
non 802 networks. As stated in [6], The purpose of
IEEE 802.21 is to improve users’ experience by provid-
ing media independent handover (MIH) functionality
that facilitates both mobile-initiated and network-
initiated handover.
To optimize handover in heterogeneous environments,
the IEEE 802.21 proposes an intelligent and generic
interface that operate between the data link (L2) and
Network layers of the protocol stack. This interface
holds all the required functions to support MIH and
thus is referred to as media independent handover func-
tion (MIHF).
In the world of the IEEE 802.21, the MIHF should be
available in the MT and the network entities. The
MIHF encompasses three types of services:
- MIH event services (MIES) detect changes in link
layer, report them to the upper layers [20]. These
events might be used as indicators for a potential
handover.
- Media independent command service (MICS) pro-
vides a set of commands that enables the upper
layers (policy or mobility management layers) to
control the status of the link such as switching it on
or off. Additionally, some of the MICS commands
enable the upper layer to ask the link layer about its
status before making the handover decision, this is
very crucial to support proactive, mobile-initiated
handover.
- Media independent information service (MIIS) pro-
vides information such as topology, location and link
layer parameters (data rate, throughput, etc.) about
different networks in the vicinity. This information,
if provided beforehand, will aid the mobility manage-
ment protocol on the handover’ decision.
The IEEE 802.21 standard provides functions and
libraries to support vertical handover in heterogeneous
networks. Also, its proposed vertical handover system
might be considered as a reference model for other
models in any future framework such as the ambient
networks [21] and Y-Comm [22].
4 Secure vertical handover in heterogeneous
environment
This section discusses some related study, that have
been trying to provide AKA protocols to secure vertical
handover mechanisms in future networks.
4.1 The handover key working group (HOKEY WG)
The IETF handover keying working group (HOKEY
WG) [4] is currently developing solutions to provide a
secure, MIH, also called inter-technology handover. The
solutions are applicable to wireless access technologies
based on the EAP [10], which is an authentication fra-
mework that supports multiple authentication protocols;
these are referred to as EAP methods. Based on the
EAP terminology, three entities are defined: The EAP
peer which is the client asking for authentication using
an EAP method, the EAP server is the entity that termi-
nates the EAP authentication method with the peer, the
EAP servers are often, but not necessarily, co-located
with AAA servers. And finally, the EAP authenticator
which is the network AP that supports the authentica-
tion functionality and enforces access control based on
the authentication result.
When a MT moves between different authenticators,
it is desirable to avoid a full EAP authentication to sup-
port fast handover. Therefore, the HOKEY group pro-
posed a new method for the EAP known as EAP Re-
authentication protocol (ERP) [23].
Initially, the MT performs a full normal EAP authenti-
cation with the A3C server in its home network. As a
result of this authentication, the EAP’s keys namely,
master session key (MSK) and extended master session
key (EMSK) are derived. For the MT to use the ERP
protocol with the AP in the target network, it needs to
derive a new re-authentication root key, this key is
derived using the EMSK and the domain name of the
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target network and hence, is called the domain specific
root key (DSRK). Using this key, further domain specific
keys such as the domain specific integrity key (DsIK)
and domain specific re-authentication MSK (DSrMSKs)
are derived, these will be used to secure the connection
between the MT and the network. Additionally, the pos-
session of the derived keys achieves authentication
between the MT and the network.
In order to get the domain name of the target network,
the ERP defines two bootstrapping modes: implicit and
explicit. The implicit mode assumes the use of link layer
specific announcements, called EAP-Initiate/Reauth-Start
packets [23] which advertise the local domain name and
are issued by ERP-supported APs. However, if the MT
misses the announcement, it needs to sends extra mes-
sages to probe for the domain name of the target network.
4.1.1 ERP analysis
The HOKEY’s work seems fairly stable particularly in
terms of keys hierarchy. However, the solutions for keys
distribution are still being discussed. Additionally, the
ERP extension suffers from some drawbacks which
could be summarized as follows:
- Although the ERP is based on the EAP platform, it
introduces new messages such as EAP-Finish/Reauth
that includes a DSRK and the new domain name.
This implies that, all the network entities such as
the APs has to be updated or replaced to support
this extra message.
- The ERP presumes that the MT will get the
domain name either implicitly when receiving the
announcement or explicitly by soliciting for it. The
authors believe that this step should be part of the
handover procedure rather than a part of the secur-
ity mechanism. Additionally, it is not clear how the
MT would communicate with the EAP Re-authenti-
cation server in the target network.
- Although, the security consideration section of the
[23] provides some analysis of the protocol features,
the protocol lacks formal analysis such as using a
formal methods approach.
- Implementing the proposed solution requires the
network components to support EAP platform, this
assumption might be feasible in heterogeneous
environment, where the network infrastructure is
owned by multiple operators.
All these drawbacks highlight the fact that, the ERP
protocol does not go along with the open architecture
of the network as presented in Section 4.3.
4.2 The 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP)
The 3GPP project has introduced two scenarios; the
3GPP-WLAN interworking, which is introduced in
Release 6 of 3GPP specifications [8] and 3GPP-WiMAX
interworking architectures as examples of heterogeneous
environments. Both scenarios presume the presence of
3GPP technology in the core network, while WLAN or
WiMax technologies are in the peripheral networks.
In the case of WiMAX to WLAN Vertical Handover,
the MT invokes EAP-AKA if the WLAN domain is vis-
ited for the first time. Otherwise, fast EAP-AKA re-
authentication is executed. In the case of WLAN to
WiMAX handover, the MT performs the initial network
entry authentication protocol (INEA) which is performed
as a part of the privacy and key management protocol
version 2 (PKMv2) [24], when visiting the domain for the
first time. Otherwise, WiMAX RAP is executed [25].
One issue with this approach is that it is fully depen-
dent on specific wireless technology; the 3GPP core net-
work in this case. Whoever wants to add a new wireless
access to an existing network will always need to
develop a method that integrates wireless access with
the 3GPP core infrastructure.
4.3 The handover AKA protocol of the mobile ethernet
The mobile ethernet consists of a core network and
wireless access connects to the core network via a layer
two switches, called edge switches. Connectivity in the
mobile ethernet is based on MAC addresses and hence
various kinds of plug-in wireless communication pro-
vided by different operators could coexist.
The mobile ethernet has proposed two AKA protocols:
the first is used for the initial authentication; when the
mobile device joins the network for the first time. The
second AKA protocol is responsible for AKA functions
in case of handover. The AKA protocols of the mobile
ethernet are not technology-specific and do not require
platforms such as the EAP and thus could be deployed by
any operator. Also, the network architecture, proposed by
the mobile ethernet is very similar to the open architec-
ture in Figure 2. Due to these factors, the handover AKA
protocol of the mobile ethernet will be act as model to
investigate the potential security threats, it will be ana-
lyzed in Section 5 using formal methods approach.
4.4 Verifying security protocols using formal methods
and Casper/FDR tool
To verify the protocol, we use a form of formal methods
approach based on Casper/FDR tool [17]. The Casper
tool accepts an abstract, human-friendly description of
the system and compiles it into CSP code, suitable for
the FDR [13] checker. CASPER’s input file consists of
eight headers as explained in Table 1:
4.5 Desired security features for AKA protocols
As stated in [26], it is desired for AKA protocols to
meet certain security properties. Therefore, a list of
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these properties will be used to analyze both the AKA
protocol of [7] and our proposed protocol.
1. Mutual entity authentication: This is achieved
when each party is assured of the identity of the
other party [26].
2. Mutual key authentication: This is achieved when
each party is assured that no other party aside from
a specifically identified second party gains access to
a particular secret key [26].
3. Mutual key confirmation: This requirement means
that each party should be ensured that the other has
possession of a particular secret key [26].
4. Key freshness: a key is considered fresh if it can be
guaranteed to be new and not reused through
actions of either an adversary or authorized party
[26].
5. Unknown-key share resilience: In the UKS attack
the two parties compute the same session key but
have different views of their peers in the key
exchange [26]. In other words, in this attack an
entity A ends up believing she shares a key with B,
although this is the case, B mistakenly believes the
key is instead shared with an entity E ≠ A
6. Key compromise impersonation resilience: This
property implies that if the Intruder compromised
the long-term key of one party, he should not be
able to masquerade to the party as a different party
[26].
5 Secure vertical handover in mobile ethernet
This section describes and formally analyzes the Vertical
Handover AKA protocol proposed by Masahiro et al.
[7]. The protocol’s participants are as follows:
- The authentication information server (AIS): man-
ages the subscriber’s information, the AIS corre-
sponds to the core A3C (CA3C) server in Figure 3.
- The authentication server (AS): authenticates the
subscribers based on information retrieved from the
AIS. The AS corresponds to the domain A3C
(DA3C) server in Figure 3.
- The entry points (EPs): represent one end point for
wireless communication and represent APs or ARs.
- The mobile device (M): is the MT accessing the
network.
Masahiro et al. [7], have assumed that, the devices of
the core network are securely installed using mutual
authentication and data integrity is maintained in the
core network, i.e., between the AIS and the AS or
between the different ASs. It is also presumed that, the
mobile device has already been authenticated in its cur-
rent (source) network using the initial AKA protocol
described in [7].
5.1 The protocol description
By considering the notation in Table 2, the Vertical
handover AKA protocol could be explained as follows:
After running the initial AKA protocol in the source
network, the mobile device and the AS would have
shared the security context that consists of the UID,
MS, AK, and SK. In case of a handover, the security
context is transferred, over a presumably secure channel
from the old AS to the new AS in the destination net-
work. This means that, the security context is always
shared between the mobile device and the network, it
also implies that, only the SK is re-established on hand-
over, while the re-establishment of the AK and the
authentication process happen after the handover. As
stated in [7], the SK transferred during the context
transfer continues to be used until the new SK is
established.
As shown in Figure 3, since both the mobile device
and the AS retain the security context, in the case of
handover, mobile device’s authentication is based on the
previous mutual authentication between the device and
the old AS.
At the end of the authentication phase, the M and the
AS derive a new handover authentication ID (HOAID),
which is used to speed up the handover response. So
Table 1 The headers of Casper’s input file
Header Description
# Free variables Defines the agents, variables and functions in the protocol
# Processes Represents each agent as a process
# Protocol description Shows all the messages exchanged between the agents
# Specification Specifies the security properties to be checked
# Actual variables Defines the real variables, in the actual system to be checked
# Functions Defines all the functions used in the protocol
# System Lists the agents participating in the actual system with their parameters instantiated
# Intruder information Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and capabilities
Aiash et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2012, 2012:57
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/57
Page 7 of 23
instead of sending the UID, the mobile device will initi-
ates the authentication protocol by sending the HOIAD
and the R1 as the first message in Figure 3.
5.2 The formal verification of the mobile ethernet
protocol
This section will formally verify the mobile ethernet’s
AKA protocol for vertical handover using the Casper/
FDR tool, then a detailed analysis of the security
properties will be introduced. As stated in [7], it is
assumed that, the network can trace the movement of
the device and determine when handover occurs. How-
ever, in order to simulate this using Casper, we intro-
duce the following preliminary messages: the entry
point’s advertisement messages (Adv), The access
request (AccReq) message, which is used by the mobile
device to indicate its intention to access the network.
The authentication request (AuthReq) message, sent by
Figure 3 The AKA protocol for handover of the mobile ethernet.
Table 2 Notations for the AKA protocol of mobile ethernet
Notation Description
M The mobile node
AIS The authentication information server
AS The authentication server
R1, R2 Random values
E(K, Msg) Encrypted Msg by key K
D(K, Msg) Decrypted Msg by key K
PRF, PRF2 Pseudo-random function
MS Master secret key MS = PRF(UUK, R1 | R2)
AK Authentication key AK = PRF(MS, R1 | R2)
SK Secret key used for encryption SK = PRF2(MS, R1 | R2)
HOAID Handover authentication ID, an security token for speeding up the authentication in case of handover: HOAID = E(AK, R1 || R2)
Aiash et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 2012, 2012:57
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/57
Page 8 of 23
the Entry point to trigger the authentication process.
None of these messages play a security role; they are
only used at the pre-authentication stage, where the EPs
advertise their presence.
A Casper input file describing the system in Figure 3
was prepared. The full description is mentioned in
Appendix A. for conciseness only the # Processes, the #
Specification and the # Intruder Information headings
are described here, while the rest are of a less signifi-
cance in terms of verifying the protocol.
The # Protocol Description section defines the proto-
col’s messages. The notation {m}{k} means that the mes-
sage (m) is encrypted using the key (k). Also, m%w
denotes that the recipient of the message is not sup-
posed to understand the message (m) instead; he should
store it in a variable (w) and pass it. In contrast, the
notation w%m means that recipient should be able to
encrypt the message (m), stored in the variable (w).
The # Processes heading shows that our system com-
prises four parties: The mobile device (M) is represented
by the INITIATOR process, the authenticator process
corresponds to EP; the last process namely, the Domain-
SERVER represents AS. For each process, the para-
meters–in the brackets–define the agents’ initial
knowledge before running protocol.
The security requirements of the system are defined
under the # Specification heading. The lines starting
with the keyword Secret define the secrecy properties of
the protocol. The Secret (M, SK, [AS, EP]) speci-
fies the SK as a secret between M, EP and AS. The lines
starting with Agreement define the protocol’s authenti-
city properties; for instance Agreement (AS, M,
[AK, R1]) specifies that, the AS is correctly authenti-
cated to M using the random number R1 and the AK.
The Aliveness assertion checks the availability of the
participants, e.g., the first Aliveness check Aliveness
(EP, M) states that when M completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with EP, then EP has previously
been running the same protocol. Note that EP may have
thought he was running the protocol with someone
other than M [17]. A stronger definition of the above
Aliveness is specified by the Weak Agreement, for
instance WeakAgreement (EP,M) assertion could be
interpreted as follows: if M has completed a run of the
protocol with EP, then EP has previously been running
the protocol, apparently with M. Generally, failing to
meet the WeakAgreement assertions implies the failure
to meet the Aliveness ones.
# Specification
Secret (M, AK, [AS])
Secret (AS, AK, [M])
Secret (M, SK, [AS, EP])
Agreement (AS, M, [AK, R1])
WeakAgreement (M, EP)
WeakAgreement (EP, M)
Aliveness (EP, M)
Aliveness (M, EP)
The # Intruder Information heading specifies the
intruder identity, knowledge and capability. The first
line identifies the intruder as Mallory, the intruder
knowledge defines the Intruder’s initial knowledge, i.e.,
we assume the intruder knows the identity of the parti-
cipants. The last line specifies that the keys of the
Domain specific type such as the MS key are crackable.
In other words, the crackable keyword tells Casper that,
the following keys could be compromised by the intru-
der at any time of the protocol’s run.
After generating the CSP description of the systems
using Casper and asking FDR to check the security
assertions, two attacks were found. The first discovered
attack below is against the WeakAgreement (M, EP)
and Aliveness (M, EP) assertions.
0. -> m : ep, as
1a. m -> I_ep : accReq
1b. I_m -> ep : accReq
2. ep -> I_m : authReq
3. I_m -> ep : Garbage
4. ep -> I_as : Garbage, h (Garbage)
5. I_as -> ep : Garbage
6. ep -> I_m : Garbage
Figure 4 shows the first discovered attack, which could
be described as follows: Initially, the intruder intercepts
the connection and replays the messages between EP
and M as in messages 1a, 1b, and 2. Pretending to be
the mobile device, the intruder composes and fake mes-
sage with a “Garbage” contents as in message 3. Using
this fake message, the protocol continues following the
normal sequence and thus, EP completes the run believ-
ing it has completed the run with M, while it was with
the intruder instead.
Figure 4 The first attack of the mobile ethernet.
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The second attack is against the WeakAgreement
(EP, M) and Aliveness (EP, M) assertions. In this
attack (Figure 5), the intruder intercepts and replays the
messages between M and EP as in messages 1a, 1b, 2a,
2b, and 3. Once the intruder intercepts message 3, it
impersonates EP and completes running the protocol as
in messages 4, 5, and 6. Thus, the mobile device will
complete running the protocol believing that, it was
with EP, while it was with the intruder instead.
0. -> m : ep, as
1a. m -> I_ep : accReq
1b. I_m -> ep : accReq
2a. ep -> I_m : authReq
2b. I_ep -> m : authReq
3. m -> I_ep : {m, r1, hoaid1}{sk}
4. I_ep -> as : {m, r1, hoaid1}{sk}, h({m,
r1, hoaid1}{sk})
5. as -> I_ep : {r2, {r1}{ak}}{sk}
6. I_ep -> m : {r2, {r1}{ak}}{sk}
5.3 Protocol analysis and security consideration
In this section, we discuss how our formal modeling
with Casper allows checking the security requirements
described in 4.5.
- Mutual entity authentication: In the first discov-
ered attack, the intruder manages to impersonate M
to run the protocol with EP. Also, in the second
attack, the intruder impersonates EP to run the pro-
tocol with the mobile device. These attacks imply
that, the protocol does not fulfill this security
requirement. These attacks could be ascribed due to
the fact that the protocol does not consider verifying
the identity of the participants.
- Mutual key authentication: the AS is authenticated
to M by proving the possession of the random value
R1 and the authentication key (AK). We got Casper
to check this using the Secret (M, AK, [AS]) and
Secret (AS, AK, [M]) assertion checks. Since no
attack was found against the key secrecy, this prop-
erty is met.
- Mutual key confirmation: Casper verifies one direc-
tion of this requirement by using the decryptable (m,
K) which checks if the message (m) is decryptable by
the key (K). We performed a similar check after
message 6 as shown in the Protocol Description
heading to verify that the valid AK is possessed by
the AS. If the check fails the protocol aborts. For the
mutual authentication, it was presumed in [7] that,
the AK along with the security context were trans-
ferred from the old AS before the protocol starts,
thus there is no need to check this using Casper.
- Key freshness: Since the keying materials are trans-
ferred from the old AS, this property could be veri-
fied by considering the key derivation functions
(KDFs) for the MS = PRF (UUK, R1|R2), AK = PRF
(MS, R1|R2) and SK = PRF2(MS, R1|R2) in the
initial AKA protocol. We could claim that, this
property is guaranteed since fresh random values R1,
R2 are included in the KDFs of the MS, AK and SK
keys.
- Unknown key share: The second, discovered attack
implies that the UKS was not met. Despite of the
fact that, the mobile device (M) and the AS share
the AK, the M mistakenly believes that the intruder
holds this key as well. Casper/FDR indicates this fact
by highlighting an attack against the WeakAgree-
ment(EP,M) and Aliveness(EP,M) assertions
in the # Specifications header.
- Key compromise impersonation resilience: this
property could be modeled by specifying the long-
term keys as crackable and then checking the
authenticity assertions. By specifying the MS key to
crackable and checking the Agreement(AS, M,
[AK, R1]) assertion, Casper verifies no breach
against this authenticity feature.
It is obvious that, the mobile ethernet’s AKA protocol
for vertical handover fulfillled the mutual key authenti-
cation, key freshness, and the key compromise imperso-
nation resilience requirements. While it failed in
meeting the mutual entity authentication and the
unknown key share. Other requirements such as mutual
key confirmation could only be achieved if we consid-
ered the protocol pre-assumptions of a secure transfer
of the security context from the previous AS. This ana-
lysis goes along with the verification results of Casper/
FDR, where two authenticity attacks were discovered.
This situation highlights the fact that, the assumptions
of mutually authenticated entities in the core network
Figure 5 The second attack of the mobile ethernet.
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and the integrity of the connection between them, i.e.,
between the old and new ASs were not efficient, which
raises the issue of the need for providing a better secur-
ity in the core network. In the current systems such as
2/3G, the core network has been assumed to be physi-
cally secure, this assumption was valid in this closed,
homogeneous environment, where the core network was
controlled by a sole operator. However, this assumption
does not hold in the case of future networks, where the
core network represents an open, multi-operators envir-
onments. Additionally, there is a need to deal with iden-
tification-related attacks to meet the mutual entity
authentication as well as the Unknown Key Share
properties.
Furthermore, the process of deriving the keying mate-
rials in the Initial AKA protocol of [7] does not define
the keys’ usability scope. Therefore, there is a need to
propose a more stable key hierarchy that specifies the
scope of each derived key.
6 The proposed solution
In order to address the previous security threats, this
section introduces a new AKA protocol for Vertical
Handover in open, heterogeneous environments similar
to the one in Figure 2, the new protocol considers the
security in the core network at the design stage. How-
ever, instead of making assumptions of a secure core
network, we need to define the part of the core network
to be protected and the type of security mechanism.
Therefore, in order to design the proposed protocol, a
progressive design approach has been followed; in the
initial draft considered in Section 6.3, security was con-
sidered in the core network between the CA3C and the
DA3Cs, modeling the proposal found secrecy and
authenticity attacks, which highlight the main source of
threats. The second version discussed in Section 6.4
simulated the case of a secure channel only between the
DA3C and the Auth, the discovered attacks in this draft
highlight the need to secure different part of the core
network. In the final version discussed in Section 6.5,
secure channels have been presumed between the DA3C
and the Auth as well as between the DA3C and the
CA3C. After simulating this case using CSP, Casper
failed to find any attacks. This implies that, to address
the afore-discovered security threats, the connections
between all the entities in the core network have to be
protected.
6.1 Defining the security system
The proposed protocol considers the network structure
in Section 2. It is crucial to show the actual parties par-
ticipating in the protocol and thus, how the proposed
protocol could be mapped to actual entities in the
network.
As shown in Figure 2, the system comprises four enti-
ties: the MT performing inter and intra handover, the
source and destination authenticators which run on the
ARs and presents the MT to the core network; the
domain A3C server (DA3C) in the source and destina-
tion domains, which are responsible for authenticating
and authorizing the MT to use the network, and the
central A3C (CA3C) server residing in the CEP.
6.2 The key hierarchy
As explained in Section 5.3, the mobile ethernet AKA
protocol does not provide a stable key hierarchy which
specifies the keys’ usability scope. Therefore, the pro-
posed protocol in this article adopts a clear key hierar-
chy as shown in Figure 6. Similar to the key hierarchy
in GSM and UMTS [27], a top level unique key uk(MT)
is stored in the SIM card and is never used for encryp-
tion purposes rather it is used for deriving further secur-
ity keys. The second level key is the domain specific
master key (DSMS), as the name implies, this key is
unique at the domain level and is derived using an irre-
versible function F1 as follows: DSMS=F1(uk(MT), seq1,
Auth_Domain_Name), where seq1 is a fresh sequence
number, the Auth_Domain_Name is the corresponding
domain name. Since each domain might have more than
one authenticator, the MT could join the domain via
any of its Auths, thus, a different secret key (SK) has to
be used for each authenticator. One AK is used for
mutual authentication between the MT and the net-
work. Similar to F1, two irreversible function F2 and F3
are used to derive AK and SK as follows: AK = F2
(seq1, DSMS), SK = F3(seq1, AuthID, DSMS). Where
AuthID is the ID of the Auth and is broadcasted by the
Auth in the form of AuthID@DomainName. Defining
the KDF used by F1-F3 functions is beyond the scope of
this article.
6.3 The initial version of the protocol
The initial version of the protocol, shown in Figure 7,
considers the presence a certain trust relationship
Figure 6 The key hierarchy.
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between the network’s entities and thus secure channels
have already been established between the CA3C and
the DA3Cs. Such secure channels could be guaranteed
by using different mechanisms such as IP security
(IPSec) [28] or any other virtual private network (VPN)
protocols. Alternatively, this could be achieved using
out-of-band approach such as agreeing on security
materials among the multiple operators. It worth noting
that, only security-related messages (starting from Msg
4) are shown in Figure 7. Also as a point of clarification,
the protocol’s transactions have been split into two
groups; indirect transactions which run over the source
network (Msg 4-8) and direct transactions with the des-
tination network (Msg 9-14).
To simulate this secure connection between the CA3C
and the DA3C using Casper/FDR, a SK se1(DA3C) is
presumed to be pre-shared between these entities. Thus,
the connections between the CA3C and the DA3C in
the source network (SrcDA3C) and the DA3C in the
destination network (DesDA3C) are protected using the
Srcse1(SrcDA3C) and Desse1(DesDA3C), respectively.
By considering the notations in Table 3, the MT resid-
ing in the source network picks the ARs’ advertisements
(Adv) which contain information about the destination
access network such the AuthID and the domain name.
The MT uses this information to generate a DSMS.
Phase 1
Msg1 : DesAuth ® MT : Adv
Generate the DSMS= F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)
The protocol starts when the MT sends a joining mes-
sage Msg 2 to the authenticator in the destination net-
work (DesAuth). The DesAuth responds by sending
AuthReq as Msg 3.
Phase 2
Msg2.MT ® DesAuth : AccReq
Msg3.DesAuth ® MT : AuthReq
By using the DSMS, the MT derives a new AK in the
destination network (DesAK) and composes Msg 4, this
message consists of a fresh sequence number seq1 used
as a challenge, authentication ID (AuthID); the MT
identity, and an unset Initauth flag (InitAuth = 0). Since
the MT has already been authenticated in the source
network, the connection with the SrcAuth will be
encrypted using the source secret key (SrcSK). The
SrcAuth passes this message to the SrcDA3C and from
there to the CA3C as Msgs 5 and 6. Using the included
mobile ID, the CA3C looks up the corresponding uk
(MT) and uses it to generate a fresh DSMS.
Phase 3
Generate the DesAK = F2(seq1, DSMS)
Msg4.MT ® SrcAuth : {MT, seq1, AuthID,
Initauth}SrcSK
Msg5.SrcAuth ® SrcDA3C : seq1, AuthID, Initauth
Msg6.SrcDA3C ® CA3C : {MT, seq1, AuthID,
Figure 7 The first version of the proposed AKA protocol.
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Initauth}Srcse1(SrcDA3C)
Generate the DSMS= F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID)
The DSMS key is included in Msg 7, which is sent
over the secure channel using the pre-shared Desse1
(DesDA3C) key. Using the information in this message,
the DesDA3C generates the authentication key (DesAK)
and returns the previously sent sequence Seq1 and a
new sequence Seq2 all the way to the MT as Msgs 8
and 9. These messages are encrypted using the derived
DesAK. Since the MT has the required information to
derive all the keys (DSMS, DesSK, DesAK), the MT
verifies the contents of Msg 9 and derives the secret key
DesSK.
Phase 4
Msg7.CA3C ® DesDA3C : {DSMS, {seq1, AuthID,
MT, Initauth}DSMS}Desse1(DesDA3C)
Generate the DesAK = F2(seq1, DSMS)
Msg8.DesDA3C ® DesAuth : {seq1, seq2}DesAK
Msg9.DesAuth ® MT : {seq1, seq2}DesAK
Verify the message contents, then derive the
DesSK:= F3(seq1, DSMS, AuthID)
The MT returns Seq2 all the way to the DesDA3C as
Msgs 10 and 11. The DesDA3C verifies the contents of
Msg 11 and derives the secret key DesSK.
Phase 5
Msg10.MT ® DesAuth : {seq1, seq2}DesAK
Msg11.DesAuth ® DesDA3C : {seq2}DesAK
Verify the message contents, then derive the DesSK:=
F3(seq1, DSMS, AuthID)
Upon verifying the Msg 11, the DesDA3C authenti-
cates the MT and acknowledges this to the CA3C, and
then generates the Secret Key (DesSK) and passes it to
the DesAuth in Msgs 12 and 13. Using the DesSK, the
DesAuth sends an encrypted access response message to
the MT as Msg 14.
Phase 6
Msg12.DesDA3C ® CA3C : {HoAckm}Desse1(DesDA3C)
Msg13.DesDA3C ® DesAuth : DesSK
Msg14.DesAuth ® MT : {AccRes}DesSK
6.3.1 Formal verification
A Casper description of the protocol was prepared.
However, since this is an initial version of the protocol,
only the #Specifications heading is mentioned here. A
complete description of the final and completely refined
version of the protocol will be included in the Appendix
B.
# Specification
Secret (MT, DesAK, [DesDA3C])
Secret (DesAuth, DesSK, [MT, DesDA3C])
Agreement (MT, DesDA3C, [seq2])
Agreement (DesDA3C, MT, [seq1, DesAK])
WeakAgreement (MT, DesAuth)
WeakAgreement (DesAuth, MT)
WeakAgreement (DesAuth, DesDA3C)
Table 3 Notation
Notation Description
MT The mobile terminal
SrcAuth Is the access router in the source peripheral network
DesAuth Is the access router in the destination peripheral network
AuthID The authenticator unique ID has the format AuthID@domainname
SrcDA3C The DA3C server in the source domain
DesDA3C The DA3C server in the destination domain
CA3C Core-endpoint entity, which has QoS and security related responsibilities
Srcse1(SrcDA3C) Pre-shared secret key between the CA3C and the SrcDA3C
Desse1
(DesDA3C)
Pre-shared secret key between the CA3C and the DesDA3C
Srcse2(SrcAuth) Pre-shared secret key between the SrcDA3C and the authenticator (SrcAuth)
Desse2
(DesAuth)
Pre-shared secret key between the DesDA3C and the authenticator (DesAuth)
uk(MT) Unique secret key shared between the CA3C and the MT
DSMS Domain specific- master key DSMS= F1 (uk(MT), seq1, auth-domain name)
SrcAK, DesAK The authentication key in the source and destination domains
SrcSK, DesSK The secret key in the source and destination networks, respectively. These are used to encrypt the connections between the MT
and the authenticators
F1, F2, F3 Irreversible key derivation functions
InitAuth flag A flag set only in the initial authentication. In case of handover, this flag will not be set
HoAckm Joining/handover acknowledgement message used by the DA3C server to inform the CA3C in the CEP about a successful
authentication
seq1, seq2 Sequence numbers
{m}K Encrypting the message (m) using the key (K)
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WeakAgreement (DesDA3C, DesAuth)
Aliveness (MT, DesAuth)
Aliveness (DesAuth,MT)
After modeling the protocol using Casper and check-
ing the corresponding CSP code using FDR checker, the
following attacks were discovered:
The first attack is against the Secret(DesAuth,
DesSK,[MT, DesDA3C]) assertion, where the Intru-
der launches a replay attack and eventually manages to
get the secret key (SK). The message sequence involved
in the attack is given below.
0. -> mt : srcAuth, desAuth, srcDA3C
1a. desAuth -> I_mt : adv, desDA3C
1b. I_desAuth -> mt : adv, desDA3C
2a. mt -> I_desAuth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> desAuth : accReq
3a. desAuth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_desAuth -> mt : authReq
4a. mt -> I_srcAuth : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{srcSK}
4b. I_mt -> srcAuth : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{srcSK}
5a. srcAuth -> I_srcDA3C : SEQ1, authID,
mt,
initauth
5b. I_srcAuth -> srcDA3C : SEQ1, authID,
mt,
initauth
6a. srcDA3C -> I_ca3c : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{Srcse1(srcDA3C)}
6b. I_srcDA3C -> ca3c : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{Srcse1(srcDA3C)}
7a. ca3c -> I_desDA3C : {DSMS, {SEQ1,
authID, mt, initauth}{DSMS}}{Desse1
(desDA3C)}
7b. I_ca3c -> desDA3C : {DSMS, {SEQ1,
authID, mt, initauth}{DSMS}}{Desse1
(desDA3C)}
8a. desDA3C -> I_desAuth : {SEQ2, SEQ1}
{DesAK}
9a. I_desAuth -> mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{DesAK}
10a. mt -> I_desAuth : {SEQ2}{DesAK}
8b. I_desDA3C -> desAuth : {SEQ2, SEQ1}
{DesAK}
9b. desAuth -> I_mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{DesAK}
10b. I_mt -> desAuth : {SEQ2}{DesAK}
11a. I_desAuth -> desDA3C : {SEQ2}{DesAK}
11b. desAuth -> I_desDA3C : {SEQ2}{DesAK}
12. desDA3C -> I_ca3c : {hoAckm}{Desse1
(desDA3C)}
13a. desDA3C -> I_desAuth : DesSK
13b. I_desDA3C -> desAuth : DesSK
14. desAuth -> I_mt : {accRes}{DesSK}
The intruder knows DesSK
The attack shown in Figure 8 could be explained as
follows:
- The intruder intercepts the messages between the
MT and the DesAuth as in messages 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b,
3a, and 3b. The MT responds by starting the proto-
col in the normal sequence and sends message 4a.
- The intruder passively intercepts and replays the
messages in the destination domain as messages (4a,
4b, 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b, 7a, and 7b). Upon intercepting
message 8a, the intruder starts a new session and
thus the intruder plays two roles as follows:
1. Acting as the DesAuth, the intruder replays
message 8a towards the MT as message 9a. The
MT, mistakenly believing that it is dealing with
the DesAuth, replies by sending message 10a
towards the DesAuth. However, this message will
be blocked by the intruder and replayed later as
message 11a. Upon verifying this message, the
DesDA3C mistakenly authenticates the intruder,
acknowledges this to the CA3C and sends the
newly derived DesSK as in message 12 and 13a
respectively. These messages will be blocked by
the intruder.
2. The reason behind the second run is to make
the DesAuth believes that it is part of the proto-
col. Therefore, acting as the DesDA3C, the intru-
der replays message 8a as message 8b towards
the DesAuth, which responds by sending mes-
sage 9b towards the MT. This message is
blocked by the intruder so the MT will not have
duplicate message. As a response to message 9b,
the user, acting as the MT, replays message 10a
(from session 1) as message 10b towards the
DesAuth. Mistakenly believing it is running the
protocol, the DesAuth passes message 10b
towards the DesDA3C as message 11b, which is
blocked by the intruder so the DesDA3C will not
have a duplicate messages and thus discover the
attack.
- To complete the protocol and close it stealthy, the
intruder passes the DesSK in message 13b to the
DesAuth, which composes the AccReq towards the
MT in message 14. This message will be blocked by
the intruder.
The second attack is against the WeakAgreement
(Des- Auth, DesDA3C) assertion, where the Intruder
launches a replay attack and successfully impersonates
the DesAuth. The message sequence involved in the
attack is given below.
0. -> mt : srcAuth, desAuth, srcDA3C
1a. desAuth -> I_mt : adv, desDA3C
1b. I_desAuth -> mt : adv, desDA3C
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2a. mt -> I_desAuth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> desAuth : accReq
3a. desAuth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_desAuth -> mt : authReq
4a. mt -> I_srcAuth : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{srcSK}
4b. I_mt -> srcAuth : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{srcSK}
5a. srcAuth -> I_srcDA3C : SEQ1, authID,
mt,
initauth
5b. I_srcAuth -> srcDA3C : SEQ1, authID,
mt,
initauth
6a. srcDA3C -> I_ca3c : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{Srcse1(srcDA3C)}
6b. I_srcDA3C -> ca3c : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{Srcse1(srcDA3C)}
7a. ca3c -> I_desDA3C : {DSMS, {SEQ1,
authID,
mt, initauth}{DSMS}}{Desse1(desDA3C)}
7b. I_ca3c -> desDA3C : {DSMS, {SEQ1,
authID,
mt, initauth}{DSMS}}{Desse1(desDA3C)}
8. desDA3C -> I_desAuth : {SEQ2, SEQ1}
{DesAK}
9. I_desAuth -> mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{DesAK}
10. mt -> I_desAuth : {SEQ2}{DesAK}
11. I_desAuth -> desDA3C : {SEQ2}{DesAK}
12. desDA3C -> I_ca3c : {hoAckm}{Desse1
(desDA3C)}
13. desDA3C -> I_desAuth : DesSK
As shown in Figure 9, the first set of messages (0-7b)
are same to the previous secrecy attack. Then, starting
Figure 8 Attack against the Secret(DesAuth,DesSK,[MT, DesDA3C])assertion.
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from message 8, the intruder impersonates the DesAuth
and completes the protocol’s run. Therefore, the discov-
ered attack could be interpreted as follows: the Des-
DA3C believes that it has successfully completed the
run with the DesAuth. However, in reality it was with
the intruder acting as the DesAuth.
6.4 The second version protocol
As shown in Figure 10, in this version of the protocol,
secure channels exist only between the DA3Cs and the
Auths. To simulate these channels, secret keys Srcse2
(SrcAuth) and Desse2(DesAuth) are pre-shared between
the Auth and the DA3C in the source and destination
domains, respectively. After preparing the Casper’s input
file and asking Casper/FDR to verify the protocol, Cas-
per found the following attack against the Agreement
(DesDA3C, MT, [seq1, DesAK]) assertion.
0. -> mt : srcAuth, desAuth, srcDA3C
1a. desAuth -> I_mt : adv, desDA3C
1b. I_desAuth -> mt : adv, desDA3C
2a. mt -> I_desAuth : accReq
2b. I_mt -> desAuth : accReq
3a. desAuth -> I_mt : authReq
3b. I_desAuth -> mt : authReq
4a. mt -> I_srcAuth : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{srcSK}
4b. I_mt -> srcAuth : {SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth}{srcSK}
5a. srcAuth -> I_srcDA3C : {SEQ1, authID,
mt,
initauth}{Srcse2(srcAuth)}
5b. I_srcAuth -> srcDA3C : {SEQ1, authID,
mt,
initauth}{Srcse2(srcAuth)}
Figure 9 Attack against the WeakAgreement(DesAuth, DesDA3C)assertion.
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6a. srcDA3C -> I_ca3c : SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth
6b. I_srcDA3C -> ca3c : SEQ1, authID, mt,
initauth
7a. ca3c -> I_desDA3C : DSMS, {SEQ1,
authID, mt, initauth}{DSMS}
7b. I_ca3c -> desDA3C : DSMS, {SEQ1,
authID,
Mallory, initauth}{DSMS}
8a. desDA3C -> I_desAuth : {{SEQ2, SEQ1}
{DesAK}}
{Desse2(desAuth)}
8b. I_desDA3C -> desAuth : {{SEQ2, SEQ1}
{DesAK}}
{Desse2(desAuth)}
9a. desAuth -> I_mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{DesAK}
9b. I_desAuth -> mt : {SEQ2, SEQ1}{DesAK}
10a. mt -> I_desAuth : {SEQ2}{DesAK}
10b. I_mt -> desAuth : {SEQ2}{DesAK}
11a. desAuth -> I_desDA3C : {{SEQ2}
{DesAK}}
{Desse2(desAuth)}
11b. I_desAuth -> desDA3C : {{SEQ2}
{DesAK}}
{Desse2(desAuth)}
12. desDA3C -> I_ca3c : hoAckm
13a. desDA3C -> I_desAuth : {DesSK}
{Desse2
(desAuth)}
13b. I_desDA3C -> desAuth : {DesSK}
{Desse2
(desAuth)}
14a. desAuth -> I_mt : {accRes}{DesSK}
14b. I_desAuth -> mt : {accRes}{DesSK}
The above sequence is depicted in Figure 11 and
could be explained as follows:
- Similar to the previous attacks, the intruder inter-
cepts the preliminary messages between the MT and
the authenticator of the destination networks as in
messages (1a-3b). Then, it intercepts and replays
messages (4a-7a) in the source domain.
- The intruder fakes message 7a by replacing the
MT with its identity (Mallory), and passes it to the
DesDA3C as message 7b. The DesDA3C, mistakenly
believing that the CA3C has identified Mallory, gen-
erates the DesAK and composes message 8a, which
will be intercepted by the intruder.
- The intruder intercepts and replays messages (9a,
9b, 10a, 10b, 11a, and 11b) in the destination
domain. Once the DesDA3C verifies the contents of
message 11b, it mistakenly authenticates the
Figure 10 The second version of the proposed AKA protocol.
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intruder, acknowledges the successful authentication
and sends the secret key DesSK as messages 12, 13a,
respectively. However, these messages will be
blocked by the intruder.
- At this stage, the intruder wants to finish the
attack stealthy, so it passes the intercepted DesSK to
the DesAuth to generate the AccRes message and
finishes the protocol in message 13b, 14a, and 14b.
6.5 The final protocol
The first and second versions of the protocol in the Sec-
tions 6.3 and 6.4, highlight the fact that, there is a need
to protect all the parts and connections in the core net-
work. Therefore, in this final version of the proposed
protocol, secure channels between the Auths and the
DA3Cs as well as the between the DA3Cs and the
CA3C have been considered, as shown in Figure 12. We
simulated this security considerations with Casper and
asked FDR to check for attacks. Casper/FDR failed to
find attacks against any of the assertions in the #Specifi-
cations heading.
This result implies that the assumption in current sys-
tems such as 3G and 2G of a physically secure core net-
work could not valid any more. Therefore, in order to
provide security in future, heterogeneous environments,
there is a need to protect each part and connection in
the core network.
6.6 AKA protocol formal verification
The main goal of the proposed protocol is to achieve
mutual authentication between the MT and the core
network in case of handover, thus authenticating the
MT to use the destination peripheral network. To
Figure 11 The attack against the Agreement(DesDA3C, MT, [seq1, DesAK])assertion.
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model the AKA protocol using Casper/FDR tool, we
prepared a Casper input file that represents the system.
The complete Casper description is in Appendix B.
This section discusses how our formal modeling with
Casper allows checking the typical security requirements
for AKA security protocols. In this section, we discuss
how our formal modeling with Casper allows checking
the typical security requirements for AKA security pro-
tocols.
- Mutual entity authentication: Casper provides no
direct specification to model this property. In order
to show how our protocol could meet this require-
ment, we explicitly, and by considering the protocol
transactions, could argue that this requirement could
be met to a certain extent in our protocol. When
making the initial contract, the MT and the CA3C
share a unique key uk(MT), which acts as the root
in the key hierarchy and is never used for encryp-
tion. We assume this key has been derived by run-
ning a KDF over identity-related information of the
MT and the CA3C, and since it is never exposed
and is stored in the MT’s SIM card, it is unlikely for
an intruder to get that key; thus, possessing this key
verifies the identity of the party.
- Mutual key authentication: the mutual authentica-
tion between the MT and the DesDA3C is based on
the secrecy of the freshly derived DesAK. We got
Casper to check this using the Secret (MT, DesAK,
[DesDA3C]) and Secret (DesDA3C, DesAK, [MT])
assertion checks. Since Casper/FDR found no attacks
against the secrecy of the DesAK, this implies that,
only other party apart form the intended ones could
possess this key.
- Mutual key confirmation: Casper verifies this
requirement by using the DECRYPTABLE (m, K)
which checks if the message (m) is decryptable by
the key (K). We performed a similar check after
messages 9 and 11 as shown in the Protocol
Description heading to verify that the valid AK is
possessed by the other party. If any of the checks
fails the protocol aborts.
- Key freshness: since there is no direct function with
Casper to simulate this feature, we included a freshly
generated sequence seq1 in the KDF as explained in
the key derivation subsection; thus the fact that Cas-
per does not detect any attack on the secrecy of the
secret and AKs implies that key freshness is not
violated.
- Unknown-key share resilience: we check this prop-
erty using the Aliveness assertions. Additionally, we
could address this attack by making a binding
between the keys and the identity of the parties. The
proposed AKA protocol has achieved this by the
Figure 12 The final version of the proposed AKA protocol.
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identity of the MT and the CA3C in the derivation
of the uk(MT). Also, the authenticator’s ID and the
domain name are included in the KDFs of the Secret
and AKs.
- Key compromise impersonation resilience: this
property could be modeled by specifying the long-
term keys as crackable and then checking the
authenticity assertions.
Three more features could be achieved by the pro-
posed protocols these are as follows:
1. Forward secrecy (FS): A protocol is said to meet
this requirement if the compromise of long-term
keys does not compromise past session keys that
have been established before the compromise of the
long-term key. We got Casper to check this property
by specifying the DSMS as crackable (Crackable =
Domainspecifickey) in the #Intruder Information
and checking the secrecy of the previous SK in the
source network (SrcSK) by adding the Secret
(SrcAuth,SrcSK,[MT, SrcDA3C]) assertion in the
#Specification heading of Appendix B. Since no
attack was found against this assertion, we could
claim that our protocol meets the FS property.
2. The second feature is whether the compromise of
the DSMS will lead to a compromise of the derived
keying materials. This feature was checked by speci-
fying DSMS as crackable and checking the secrecy
of the DesAK and DesSK in assertions Secret(MT,
DesAK, [DesDA3C]) and Secret(DesAuth, DesSK,
[MT, DesDA3C], respectively. We had run this
check and could confirm that, no attacks were
found.
3. The third feature is whether the compromise of
one of the SKs will lead to the compromise of the
other SKs. We tested this by adding the SrcSK key
to the Intruder Knowledge and checked the secrecy
of the new secret key (DesSK). No attacks were
found and thus we could confirm that, this protocol
meets this requirement.
6.7 Protocol analysis and security consideration
Table 4 shows a summary of the results, it compares
between the mobile ethernet’s AKA protocol, the first,
second and final versions of our proposed solution.
7 Further work
The research in this article aims at providing a plat-
form-independent AKA protocol that could be imple-
mented by a wide variety of network operators.
However, since some network providers deploy the EAP
as a platform on top of which different types of security
protocols could run, the authors want to consider inte-
grating the proposed AKA protocol as an EAP method.
Thus, operators will have the choice to use the proposed
protocol as an EAP method or as a pure AKA protocol.
Having had the AKA protocol verified by Casper, the
next step will be implementing the protocol by using
compilers like COSP-J [29] which is a compiler that
takes a description of a security protocol in a simple,
abstract language, and produces a Java implementation
of the it. In addition, implementing the protocols on
smart phones gives us a chance to measure the perfor-
mance of the proposed protocol in real test-bed as well
as to discover any implementation-based attacks.
Furthermore, study has already started within our
group to propose a business model which will define
charging and accounting models to charge mobile
devices in heterogeneous networks.
8 Conclusion
This article discussed several research efforts, which
have been trying to address the issue of authenticating
the mobile nodes when they perform vertical handover
in heterogeneous environment. The discussion showed
that most of the solutions had realized the threats
resulting from the open nature of future networks and
as a result different approaches were proposed. Some
solutions tried to conceal the divergence of the core net-
work either by considering a specific technology as a
backbone of the core network, or by deploying a com-
mon framework on top of which security protocols
could be installed and run. The mobile ethernet group
proposed a new AKA, which considers an open network
architecture. Analyzing and verifying the mobile ether-
net’s AKA protocol using Casper/FDR shows that the
protocol is vulnerable to an authentication attack. Also,
the protocol failed to meet some desired security prop-
erties, which could be ascribed to the lack of security in
the core network. Therefore, a new AKA protocol was
introduced in this article, the article described the
refinement stages of the protocol along with the discov-
ered attacks. The final version of the proposed protocol
was proven to be secure and to fulfill the desired secur-
ity properties.
Appendix A: Code for formal analysis of the
handover AKA protocol for mobile ethernet
# Free Variables M: MobileTerminal
EP : AccessRouterAuthenticator
AS : DomainA3CServer
AuthID : Identity
Initauth : Flags
R1 : initialSeq
R2 : Sequence
HOAID1: OldToken
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HOAID2: NewToken
AK : AuthenticationKeys
SK : SecretKeys
MS: Domainspecifickey
F: AuthenticationKeys × initialSeq ×
Sequence ->
NewToken
h : HashFunction
AccReq, AccRes,AuthReq, Adv: Messages
HoAckm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (AK, AK), (SK, SK), (MS, MS),
(F,F)
# Processes
INITIATOR(M, EP, R1,AuthID,Initauth,
AccReq, AuthReq, MS, AK, SK, HOAID1)
Authenticator(EP,AS, AuthReq, Adv,
AccRes)
DomainSERVER(AS,M, R2, HoAckm, MS, AK,
SK, HOAID1)
# Protocol Description
0. -> M : EP, AS
1. M -> EP: AccReq
2. EP -> M : AuthReq
3. M -> EP : {M,R1, HOAID1}{SK}%w
4. EP -> AS : w%{M,R1,HOAID1}{SK}, h(w%
{M,R1,
HOAID1}{SK})
5. AS -> EP: {R2,{R1}{AK}%z}{SK}%v
6. EP -> M : v%{R2,{R1}{AK}%z}{SK}
[decryptable(z, AK)andnth(decrypt(z, AK), 1) == R1]
# Specification
Secret (M,AK,[AS])
Secret (AS,AK,[M])
Secret (M,SK,[AS, EP])
Agreement (AS, M, [AK, R1])
WeakAgreement (M, EP)
WeakAgreement (EP,M)
Aliveness (EP, M)
Aliveness (M, EP)
# Actual Variables
m, Eve: MobileTerminal
ep : AccessRouterAuthenticator
as : DomainA3CServer
Authid : Identity
InitAuth : Flags
hoaid1: OldToken
hoaid2: NewToken
r1 : initialSeq
r2 : Sequence
ak : AuthenticationKeys
sk : SecretKeys
ms: Domainspecifickey
accReq, accRes,authReq, adv: Messages
hoackm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (ms, ms), (ak, ak), (sk, sk)
# Functions
symbolic F
# System
INITIATOR (m,ep, r1,Authid,InitAuth,
accReq, authReq, ms, ak,sk,hoaid1)
Authenticator (ep, as, authReq,adv,
accRes)
DomainSERVER (as,m, r2,hoackm, ms,ak,sk,
hoaid1)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = m, as, Mallory,
Authid, ep
Crackable = Domainspecifickey
Appendix B: Code for formal analysis of the
proposal handover AKA protocol
# Free Variables
MT: Agent
SrcAuth : SrcAccessRouterAuthenticator
DesAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
SrcDA3C : SrcDomainA3CServer
DesDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
CA3C : CentralA3CServer
AuthID : Identity
Initauth : Flags
seq1 : initialSeq
seq2 : Sequence
Srcse1 : SrcDomainA3CServer->
PresharedKeys
Table 4 Comparison
The security property The AKA of mobile ethernet Initial version Second version Refined proposal
Mutual entity authentication No Yes Yes Yes
Mutual key authentication/keys’ secrecy Yes No Yes Yes
Mutual key confirmation Yes No Yes Yes
Key freshness Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unknown-key share resilience No No No Yes
Key compromise impersonation resilience Yes Yes Yes Yes
Defining key scope No Yes Yes Yes
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Desse1 : DesDomainA3CServer->
PresharedKeys
Srcse2 : SrcAccessRouterAuthenticator->
PresharedKeys
Desse2 : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator->
PresharedKeys
uk : Agent-> PresharedKeys
SrcAK, DesAK : AuthenticationKeys
SrcSK, DesSK : SecretKeys
DSMS: Domainspecifickey
AccReq, AccRes,AuthReq, Adv: Messages
HoAckm : AcknowledgementMessage
F1: PresharedKeys × initialSeq × Identity
-> Domainspecifickey
F2: initialSeq × Domainspecifickey ->
AuthenticationKeys
F3: initialSeq × Domainspecifickey ×
Identity ->
SecretKeys
InverseKeys = (SrcAK, SrcAK), (uk, uk),
(SrcSK, SrcSK),
(DSMS, DSMS), (Srcse1,Srcse1),(Srcse2,
Srcse2),
(Desse1,Desse1),(Desse2, Desse2),
(DesAK,DesAK),(DesSK, DesSK), (F1, F1),
(F2,F2),(F3,F3)
# Processes
INITIATOR(MT,seq1,AuthID,Initauth,
SrcAK, SrcSK, AccReq) knows uk(MT)
SrcAuthenticator(SrcAuth,MT,SrcDA3C,
SrcSK, AuthReq)
knows Srcse2(SrcAuth)
DesAuthenticator(DesAuth,MT, DesDA3C,
AuthReq, Adv,
AccRes) knows Desse2(DesAuth)
SrcAAASERVER(SrcDA3C,CA3C, SrcAuth,
SrcAK, SrcSK) knows Srcse1(SrcDA3C),
Srcse2(SrcAuth)
DesAAASERVER(DesDA3C,CA3C,DesAuth,
seq2,HoAckm) knows Desse1(DesDA3C),
Desse2(DesAuth)
CentralSERVER(CA3C, SrcDA3C, DesDA3C)
knows
Srcse1(SrcDA3C), Desse1(DesDA3C), uk
(MT)
# Protocol Description
0. -> MT : SrcAuth, DesAuth, SrcDA3C
1. DesAuth -> MT :Adv, DesDA3C
< DSMS := F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID) >
2. MT -> DesAuth: AccReq
3. DesAuth -> MT : AuthReq
< DesAK := F2(seq1, DSMS) >
4. MT -> SrcAuth : {seq1,AuthID, MT, Ini-
tauth}{SrcSK}
5. SrcAuth -> SrcDA3C : {seq1,AuthID, MT,
Initauth}{
Srcse2(SrcAuth)}
6. SrcDA3C -> CA3C : {seq1,AuthID, MT,
Initauth}{
Srcse1(SrcDA3C)}
< DSMS := F1(uk(MT), seq1, AuthID) >
7. CA3C -> DesDA3C : {DSMS, {seq1,AuthID,
MT, Initauth}
{DSMS}}{Desse1(DesDA3C)}
< DesAK := F2(seq1, DSMS) >
8. DesDA3C -> DesAuth: {({seq2, seq1}
{DesAK}%z)%x}
{Desse2(DesAuth)}
9. DesAuth -> MT : x%({seq2, seq1}
{DesAK}%z)
[decryptable(z, DesAK)andnth(decrypt(z, DesAK), 2) ==
seq1]
< DesSK := F3(seq1, DSMS, AuthID);
seq2 := nth(decrypt(z, DesAK), 1) >
10. MT -> DesAuth : ({seq2}{DesAK}%y)%q
11. DesAuth -> DesDA3C: {(q% seq2}
{DesAK})%y}
{Desse2(DesAuth)}
[decryptable(y, DesAK)andnth(decrypt(y, DesAK), 1)
== seq2]
< DesSK := F3(seq1, DSMS, AuthID) >
12. DesDA3C -> CA3C : {HoAckm}{Desse1
(DesDA3C)}
13. DesDA3C -> DesAuth :{DesSK}{Desse2
(DesAuth)}
14. DesAuth -> MT : {AccRes}{DesSK}
# Specification
Secret(MT,DesAK,[DesDA3C])
Secret(DesAuth,DesSK,[MT, DesDA3C])
Secret(SrcAuth,SrcSK,[MT, SrcDA3C])
Agreement(MT, DesDA3C, [seq2])
Agreement(DesDA3C, MT, [seq1, DesAK])
WeakAgreement(MT, DesAuth)
WeakAgreement(DesAuth, MT)
WeakAgreement(DesAuth, DesDA3C)
WeakAgreement(DesDA3C, DesAuth)
Aliveness(MT, DesAuth)
Aliveness(DesAuth, MT)
# Actual Variables
mt, Mallory: Agent
srcAuth : SrcAccessRouterAuthenticator
desAuth : DesAccessRouterAuthenticator
srcDA3C : SrcDomainA3CServer
desDA3C : DesDomainA3CServer
ca3c : CentralA3CServer
authID : Identity
initauth : Flags
SEQ1 : initialSeq
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SEQ2 : Sequence
srcAK, desAK : AuthenticationKeys
srcSK, desSK : SecretKeys
dsms: Domainspecifickey
accReq : AccessReqmessages
accRes: AccessResmessages
authReq: Authmessage
adv:AdvMessages
hoAckm : AcknowledgementMessage
InverseKeys = (dsms, dsms), (srcAK,
srcAK), (srcSK, srcSK), (desAK, desAK),
(desSK, desSK)
# Functions
symbolic Srcse1,Srcse2,Desse1,Desse2,
uk, F1, F2, F3
# System
INITIATOR(mt,SEQ1,authID,initauth,
srcAK, srcSK,accReq)
SrcAuthenticator(srcAuth, mt,srcDA3C,
srcSK, authReq)
DesAuthenticator(desAuth, mt, desDA3C,
authReq,adv, accRes)
SrcAAASERVER(srcDA3C,ca3c,srcAuth,
srcAK, srcSK)
DesAAASERVER(desDA3C,ca3c,desAuth,
SEQ2,hoAckm)
CentralSERVER(ca3c, srcDA3C, desDA3C)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {mt, srcDA3C,des-
DA3C, Eve, ca3c, authID, srcAuth,desAuth,
uk(Eve)}
Crackable = PresharedKeys
Crackable = Domainspecifickey
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